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This paper offers an assessment of European corporate tax regimes using forward-
looking indicators for corporate investment based on the Devereux-Griffith 
methodology. It draws on time series of average effective tax rates (EATR) using a 
detailed set of tax parameters for 27 EU Member States as well as some important non-
EU countries. The analysis shows that over time the reduction in the corporate effective 
average tax rates (EATR) was lower than for the corporate statutory rates and the 
figures suggest that simple corporate tax base broadening by means of less generous 
capital allowances is not a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. Finally, it is 
shown that the tax gap between the old and new EU Member States has grown over 
time and even accelerated after accession. 
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1  Introduction 
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in taxation of corporate 
investment. Since the publication of the Company Tax Study
1, several initiatives have 
been taken on the European level to suggest ways of overcoming distortions in the 
Internal Market, particularly as regards investment decisions and competition
2. From 
the point of view of economic efficiency, tax systems should ideally be as "neutral" as 
possible in terms of economic choices. From this perspective, and in an international 
context, similar investments should not face markedly different effective levels of 
taxation purely because they are undertaken in different countries. Therefore, the size of 
effective tax rate differentials and the dispersion of effective tax rates deserve careful 
attention in order to analyse the role of taxes for investment decisions in the Internal 
Market. 
At the same time there is growing awareness that EU policy measures should 
take into account the diversity in the European corporate tax landscape. To capture the 
dynamics of the tax burden on investment, it is of particular importance to understand 
how the tax systems in the Member States have developed over time. When policy 
makers want to evaluate the impact of taxation on economic activity and understand the 
usefulness and likely effects of their decisions, the information derived from statutory 
                                                 
1 Company taxation in the Internal market -  SEC(2001) 1681 (2001) 
2 COM(2001) 582 of 23/10/2001 and COM (2003) 726   6
corporate tax rates needs to be complemented by the elements composing the tax base in 
order to evaluate the effective tax burdens incurred. 
Ideally, marginal effective tax rates are calculated using firm-level data. 
However, data samples exist for this type of calculation only in a few Member States. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to calculate forward looking measures with these 
samples. While backward-looking firm-level indicators may possibly give an accurate 
picture of the tax position of a particular company, they cannot give an accurate picture 
of the incentives generated by a particular tax regime as tax payments in any period may 
depend crucially on the past history of the company and hence may vary between 
companies which are otherwise identical. This makes international comparisons very 
difficult as the methodology does not allow for a single representative indicator for the 
country as a whole.  
When the analysis of the impact of taxation on investment behaviour is the 
objective, and therefore the effects of tax legislation on future choices has to be 
captured, then only forward-looking indicators can illustrate the influence of taxation 
systems to the investment choices of companies and are therefore a useful policy tool 
when the research focus is on efficiency and competitiveness. The indicators analysed 
in this paper are based on such a forward-looking modelling approach and includes the 
relevant taxes triggered by corporate investment making abstraction of the influence of 
the economic conditions. Similar studies based on forward-looking rates have been 
conducted by the government of Canada, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (UK) and Yoo 
(OECD). The current study focuses on the effects of tax reforms over time and offers 
both a broad geographical scope and detail in the calculations.   7
This paper addresses the methodology used and presents estimates of the 
average effective tax rates (EATR) on investment in the 27 EU Member States over the 
period 1998 to 2007
3. For comparison, it also presents similar estimates for 4 other 
European countries (Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland and Norway) and for 3 non-European 
countries (USA, Canada, and Japan). The calculations are based on a mix of assets and 
liabilities taking as a base case a manufacturing company. Nevertheless, sensitivity 
analysis carried out for the service sector has shown that the model is robust with 
respect to the relative ranking of countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a description of the 
methodology underlying the measurement of the effective tax rates. In section 3, the 
effective tax burden on domestic investment under the general corporate tax regimes at 
the EU level is analysed for 2007. The analysis discusses the developments of the tax 
systems in the EU Member States over time in section 4. Section 5 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
2  Methodology 
The methodology used for the calculation of the effective tax rates is set out by 
Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), and has also been used in an earlier study by the 
European Commission
4. The basic approach proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999, 
2003) is to consider a hypothetical incremental investment located in a specific country 
undertaken by a company resident possibly in the same country, but also possibly in 
                                                 
3 For more detailed results see Devereux et al. (2008). 
4 A detailed discussion of the methodology as it is applied in this project is given by 
Schreiber/Spengel/Lammersen (2001).   8
another country
5. Given a post-tax real rate of return required by the company's 
shareholder, it is possible to use the tax code to compute the implied required pre-tax 
real rate of return, known as the cost of capital
6. The cost of capital can be seen as the 
internal rate of return required for the company in order to generate the same return as 
an alternative risk-free investment. The proportionate difference between the cost of 
capital and the required post-tax real rate of return is known as the effective marginal 
tax rate (EMTR)
7. The difference between the cost of capital (i.e. the implied required 
pre-tax real rate of return) and the post-tax required real rate of return is a measure of 
the additional return required due to taxation: this is known as the effective marginal tax 
wedge
8. This approach is based on the presumption that firms undertake all investment 
projects which earn at least the required rate of return. For a given required post-tax rate 
of return, the more severe the tax system, the higher is the cost of capital, and hence the 
less likely that any specific investment project will be undertaken.   
A complementary approach is to consider discrete choices for investment, and in 
particular the discrete location choice. If two locations are mutually exclusive, then the 
company must choose between them. In this case, the impact of taxation on the choice 
is measured by the proportion of total income taken in tax in each location. Devereux 
                                                 
5 Issues of cross-border taxation are not considered in this paper. 
6 In the absence of personal taxes, the company is assumed to be required to earn a post-tax real rate of 
return of 5%. The cost of capital is the implied required pre-tax real rate of return. The cost of capital is 
calculated for each of 15 different types of investment (5 assets, each possibly financed from 3 sources). 
7 The EMTR is a straightforward calculation as the proportionate difference between the cost of capital 
and the post-tax real rate of return of 5%. The EMTR is not represented in the tables, since, in the absence 
of personal taxes, it does not provide more information than the cost of capital. 
8 Assuming a required post-tax real rate of return of 5%, the difference between the cost of capital and 5% 
represents the effective marginal tax wedge, showing by how much the pre-tax real rate of return should 
be increased as a result of taxation in order to obtain the required post-tax return of 5%.    9
and Griffith (1999, 2003) proposed a measure of an effective average tax rate (EATR) 
to identify the effect of taxation on such discrete location choices. The EATR is the 
proportionate difference of the net present value of a profitable investment project in the 
absence of tax and the net present value of the same investment in the presence of tax
9.  
In both cases, the hypothetical investment takes place in one period and 
generates a return in the next period. It is assumed throughout that the tax system is 
expected to remain unchanged over the life of the investment. The impact of taxation 
depends on a number of features of the tax system, including the statutory tax rate, 
capital allowances, the treatment of foreign source income, wealth taxes paid by the 
company, as well as possibly the treatment at the corporate and personal level of 
dividends paid by the company, and wealth and capital gains taxes at the personal 
level
10.  
Several assumptions need to be made in order to define the hypothetical 
investment project as well as the economic conditions under which the investment takes 
place. In particular, the following assumptions hold:  
•  The investment is made in the manufacturing sector;  
                                                 
9 The effective average tax rate is in principle the relevant rate for analysing discrete investment choices, 
such as where to locate. The EATR is calculated for each of 15 different types of investment (5 assets, 
each possibly financed from 3 sources). However, now there is not only a post-tax real rate of return 
required by the shareholder, but also a fixed pre-tax rate real rate of return of 20%, while the minimum 
required post-tax real rate of return (in the absence of personal taxes) remains at 5%. This generates an 
investment project with a positive net present value. The EATR is a measure of the present value of taxes 
paid expressed as a proportion of the net present value of the income stream (excluding the initial cost of 
the investment). 
10 The treatment of foreign source income and the influence of the personal income tax are beyond the 
scope of this paper.   10
•  The shareholder is assumed to be able to earn a real rate of return of 5% on an 
alternative investment. If the alternative investment is not taxed, this is also the 
post-tax return required by the shareholder on the hypothetical investment 
analysed. Any tax on the alternative asset reduces the required post-tax rate of 
return on the hypothetical investment;  
•  The inflation rate is assumed to be 2% in all countries;  
•  Separate investments in five different assets are considered. They are as follows, 
together with the true economic depreciation rate assumed in each case (based 
on a Ifo Institute survey, Leibfritz 1989, and research performed in the 
framework of the Company Tax Study (2001)):: intangibles (taken for tax 
purposes here to be the purchase of a patent) (depreciation rate of 15.35%); 
industrial buildings (3.1%); machinery (17.5%); financial assets (zero); and 
inventories (zero). In presenting averages over different forms of investment, 
these assets are weighted equally;  
•  Three sources of finance for investment in each asset are separately considered: 
retained earnings, new equity and debt. In presenting averages over different 
forms of investment, weights used are taken from OECD (1991): retained 
earnings 55%, new equity 10% and debt 35%;   
•  In principle, only corporate taxation is considered.   
Common figures to all countries for the real rate of return, the inflation rate, the 
true economic depreciation on assets and the weights for investments and sources of   11
finance apply in order to identify differences in effective tax rates due to tax regimes, 
rather than due to differences in underlying economic conditions.  
The types of parameters incorporated into the model are as follows: 
•  Statutory corporation tax rates, including surcharges and typical local tax rates 
on profit, as well as various special rates which apply to specific forms of 
income or expenditure; 
•  Corporate real estate taxes, net wealth taxes and other non-profit taxes on assets; 
•  Capital allowances for industrial buildings, machinery, intangibles (the purchase 
of a patent) and the tax treatment of financial assets and inventories. 
The focus of this paper is on discrete investment choices and locational investment 
decisions as captured by the effective average tax rate (EATR).
11 
3  Effective tax burden on domestic investment under the general corporate tax 
regime at the EU level in 2007 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the corporate EATRs in the European Union 
and further countries considered. For the EU27, the average EATR is 22.3%, but this 
overall average hides considerable dispersion in the EATR levels across the individual 
Member States. The EATR is the lowest in Bulgaria (8.8%) and the highest in Germany 
(35.5%). In the EU15, the EATR (26.3%) is considerably higher than in the new 
Member States referred to as the EU+12 (17.4%). 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of cost of capital results see Devereux et al (2008) and Devereux/Lammersen/Spengel 
(2003).   12




































Looking at other European countries, the picture does not change substantially. 
The two EU candidates Croatia and Turkey show EATRs of 17.2% and 18.0% 
respectively. The EATRs in Norway and Switzerland are 24.5% and 18.8%. In contrast, 
the highly developed countries outside Europe – the United States, Canada, and Japan – 
have substantially higher tax levels than the average in Europe. Canada (36.0%) and the 
United States (36.9%) even show slightly higher EATRs than Germany, the European 
country with the highest EATR. Companies in Japan face by far the highest EATR with 
41.7%.
12 
One can think of several reasons for the wide dispersion of effective tax levels. 
Size and the economic development of the countries can lead to higher EATRs for 
                                                 
12 The calculations for Switzerland, the USA and Canada were based on the Canton of Zürich, the State of 
California and the State of Ontario, respectively.   13
larger countries. In Figure 2 we therefore compare the GDP with the EATRs in the 
EU27. The graph shows that GDP and EATR are positively correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.72. The countries with a contribution of GDP to the EU27 
totaling more than 10% show the highest EATR (Germany, France, Italy, and UK). The 
range is from 29.3% in the UK to 35.5% in Germany. Also Spain with a GDP of 8.5% 
of EU total has a high EATR of 34.5%. This finding is in line with theoretical literature 
(Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991), and Haufler/Wooton (1999)) and empirical 
findings (Slemrod (2004), Huizinga/Nicodème (2006), Ghinamo/Panteghini/Revelli 
(2008)). However, the dispersion of EATRs is large for countries contributing less than 
0.25% of the total European GDP
13. Thus, for the small countries no conclusions can be 
drawn with respect to size and EATR level. Further, companies in the EU15 face higher 
EATRs than in the EU+12; the only exemptions are Ireland (14.4%) and Malta 
(32.2%)
14. Although within Europe there might be tax competition at work since 
countries are rather small compared to other continents, corporate tax differentials 
between large and smaller countries may be sustainable because of the existence of 
agglomeration rents. 
                                                 
13 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia 
14 There are many reasons for differences in tax levels. Listing these would go beyond the scope of the 
analysis in this paper.   14





















































To understand the mechanisms behind these observations, it is important to 
identify the tax parameters that technically drive the EATR levels in the EU27. The 
EATR reflects the present value of taxes in case the investment yields a pre-tax rate of 
return of 20%. Since the economic conditions are held constant for all locations, the 
effective tax levels are exclusively driven by the tax regulation in the considered 
countries. The higher the rate of return, the higher is the impact of the statutory tax rates 
and the lower the influence of tax allowances embedded in the tax base. Figure 3 shows 
both the combined statutory tax rate and the EATR for each country. The combined 
statutory tax rate comprises the corporate tax rate and any surcharges and local profit 
tax rates. Within the EU27, statutory tax rates range between 10% and 39.4% which is a 
higher span than for EATRs. Considering the old and new Member States, it is striking 
that all new Member States, except for Malta, have statutory tax rates below 25%; all   15
old Member States, except for Ireland, levy taxes at 25% and higher. Bulgaria and 
Cyprus have the lowest tax rates with 10%, followed by Ireland. The highest statutory 
tax rates apply in Italy (37.3%), Spain (38%), and Germany (39.4%). The two EU 
candidate countries Croatia and Turkey both tax corporate profits at 20%. Switzerland 
has a slightly higher tax rate of 21.3%, the Norwegian tax rate is 28%. The non-
European countries all show significantly higher statutory tax rates comparable to the 
three highest taxing countries in the EU. 
By comparing the statutory tax rates and the EATRs in Figure 3 it turns out that 
both indicators are closely correlated, which is not surprising as the EATR is calculated 
at a rate of return of 20% before taxes. For most countries the EATR is slightly below 
the statutory tax rates. This stems to a great extent from the fact that capital allowances 
for machinery, buildings, and intangible assets lead to postponed tax payments 
compared to an alternative investment so that the real investment is more advantegeous 
than the alternative investment. In some countries, the EATR exceeds the statutory tax 
rates. In Ireland, the real estate taxes are particularly high compared to profit taxes. 
France levies a business tax (taxe professionnelle) on fixed assets. Cyprus applies a 
special tax on financial assets. 
Only for Belgium, Estonia, and Italy, the EATR is considerably below statutory 
tax rates. This is mainly due to a specific tax regime for financial assets or differences in 
tax treatment according to the sources of finance, which both influence the results since 
we are considering a combination of five different assets financed through three 
different sources of finance. Belgium introduced a notional interest deduction in 2006. 
For equity finance, a deemed interest payment is deductible comparable to real interest   16
payments for debt finance. As a result, income is partly tax-exempt; the EATR thus 
drops significantly below the statutory tax rate (8.6 percentage points). In Estonia, 
corporate taxes are not levied until dividends are distributed. This leads to an equal low 
EATR level for investment financed by debt finance and retained earnings, while higher 
EATRs arise for new equity. Since new equity only accounts for 10% of total finance 
under the model, the average EATR over all assets and sources of finance is 
considerably lower than the statutory tax rate. In Italy, the local tax of 4.25% is not 
applied to financial assets, which results in a lower EATR.  










































Statutory corporate tax rates
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Figure 4 shows the averages of the EU27 per asset and sources of finance. Most 
apparent is the fact that investments financed with equity are taxed higher than debt-
financed investments. This is related to the fact that interest payments for debt-financed 
investments are mostly fully deductible from the taxable base, i.e. only the residual   17
income is taxed at the corporate level. In case of equity-financed investments, a 
deduction similar to the interest payment deduction is generally not available. Some 
countries, such as Belgium, do allow for a deemed interest payment in order to achieve 
neutrality of the source of finance. The difference between the EATR on debt financed 
investment compared to equity financed investment increases with the level of statutory 
tax rates as can be seen by comparing the results for the EU15 and the EU+12. 
There is a small difference between the two equity-financed pillars in Figure 4. 
Investments financed by retained earnings bear a slightly lower EATR than 
investments financed with new equity. In general, profit at the corporate level is taxed 
independently from its further allocation. In most countries the EATR for retained 
earnings equals that for new equity. The difference stems entirely from the Estonian 
corporate tax system which does not tax retained earnings as can be seen from the 
pillars for the EU+12 in Figure 4. 
Comparing the asset-specific EATRs, investments in intangible assets or in 
machinery bear the lowest EATRs. The highest EATRs apply for investments in 
financial assets. The EATRs clearly show the impact of the tax depreciation rules. 
Financial assets do not receive any capital allowances for tax purposes since there is no 
account for economic depreciation. The EATRs are the lowest for machinery and 
intangibles since for these two assets the depreciation allowances for tax purposes 
overcompensate in most countries the actual economic depreciation rate. Moreover, 
both assets reveal differences between the EU15 and the EU+12. Intangibles are taxed 
lower than machinery in the EU15, while the situation in the EU+12 is exactly the 
opposite. The EATRs for industrial buildings are higher not only because of a longer   18
depreciation period but also because a real estate tax for buildings applies in most 
countries. 



















Figure 5 presents the present values of capital allowances for buildings, 
intangible assets, and machinery. These reflect the present value of the annual tax 
depreciations. The higher the present value, the higher is the tax reducing effect of the 
deduction. On average in the EU27, the present value of capital allowances is 0.47 for 
industrial buildings, 0.78 for intangibles, and 0.81 for machinery. The level is 
comparable in the other countries considered. Machinery is treated more or less 
homogeneously in all countries; the standard deviation amounts to 0.05. There are 
larger differences in the tax depreciation of intangibles with a standard deviation of 
0.08. The most heterogeneous treatment is found for buildings; the standard deviation is 
0.12 in the EU27. In contrast to the statutory tax rates, there is no clear distinction   19
between old and new Member States or between small and large countries. Countries 
with a considerably lower present value of capital allowances – i.e. with less generous 
conditions for tax depreciation – are Austria, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, and 
Slovenia. Belgium, Denmark, and Lithuania are characterised by considerably more 
generous regulations for tax depreciation. 















































4  Development of the effective tax burden on domestic investment under the 
general corporate tax regimes in the EU between 1998 and 2007 
Within the last ten years, one observes a considerable downward trend of tax 
levels. Figure 6 presents the unweighted EATR averages for the EU27 and for the new 
and the old Member States. In total, the average for all Member States decreased from 
29.1% in 1998 to 22.4% in 2007. At the end of the nineties, the difference between old 
and new Member States still was comparably low with only 3.3 percentage-points 
differential. It increased, however, to 8.9 percentage points in 2007. While the EU15   20
curve shows a continuous decline over time, the EU+12 curve falls considerably from 
1999 to 2005. From then on, the average of EATRs remains stable. In contrast, the 
downward trend was somewhat intensified from 2005 on in the old Member States. 
The standard deviation of the EU Member States does not change dramatically 
over time. For the EU15, it decreases from 7.5 to 5.8, for the EU+12 it increases from 
5.9 to 6.0 with, however, several ups and downs during the beginning of 2000. Overall, 
one can observe a higher consolidation in effective tax levels for the old Member 
States, the new Member States show more changes in their tax policies. Besides other 
reasons, this might also be driven by the fact, that in the EU15 there are several large 
countries that do not react on tax competition in the same way as small, usually more 
open, countries. 
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As was outlined before, the EATR highly depends on the statutory tax rates and 
so the decline in EATRs over time must be mostly driven by cuts of the statutory tax 
rates. The sum of rate cuts in percentage-points exceeds the sum of changes in EATR 
(8.7 vs. 7.0 on EU average). This might be a hint that tax rate cuts came along with 
base broadenings. The present values of capital allowances, however, remained stable 
over time on average. Several countries broadened their taxable base by allowing for 
less generous capital allowances in the long run.
15 There are also countries which 
improved the possibilities for capital allowance.
16 Yet in tendency, capital allowances 
were worsened in countries with higher statutory tax rates.  
There are several further reasons why the EATRs did not decrease to the same 
extent as the statutory tax rates: First, this effect is technically driven. Within the EATR 
we consider several sources of finance, one of which is debt finance which is less 
dependent on the statutory tax rates. Taking only investments financed with equity into 
account, the decrease in EATR is -7.4. Second, considerable tax reforms took place 
during the last ten years. Eg. in Germany, there was a clear tax rate cut for retained 
earnings, but less pronounced for other sources of finance. Third, there were increases 
in non-profit taxes, in particular in Ireland and Finland.  
The highest rate reductions in all countries took place in 2000 and in 2005. 
Bulgaria had the highest declines of statutory tax rate (-27 percentage-points) and 
                                                 
15 Decreasing generosity of capital allowances in the ten-year period: industrial buildings: Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, and Slovenia; intangibles: Austria, Slovenia, and UK; machinery: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Poland, Slovenia. 
16 Increasing generosity of capital allowances: industrial buildings: Czech Republic, Lithuania, and 
Slovakia; intangibles: Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia; machinery: Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Slovakia.   22
EATR (-23.9 percentage-points). Most countries show similar levels of the decline in 
statutory tax rates and EATR. Germany, however, had a clear tax rate cut of 17 
percentage-points over time but only a decrease of 5.7 percentage-points in EATR. 
Until 2000, Germany applied a split rate system for corporate income. The corporate 
tax rate was 45% (40% in 1999 and 2000) on retained earnings. It was reduced to 30% 
in case the profits were distributed. From 2001 on, all profits were taxable at 25%. 
Considering the EATR on retained earnings separately, the decline was 11 percentage-
points (50.5 to 39.5 over all assets). This effect becomes less important if one considers 
the weighted average over all sources of finance. 
In three countries, there are increases in EATR over time: Ireland, Hungary, and 
Sweden. Ireland was obliged to raise the corporate tax rate for the manufacturing sector 
to 12.5%, moreover, the effective rate of real estate tax increased. Hungary introduced 
a solidarity tax of 4% on corporate income tax due in 2007. Sweden held the corporate 
income tax rate constant at 28% but reduced an incentive for new investments. A profit 
periodisation reserve (periodiseringsfond) postpones the taxation of parts of the profit 
for five years. In 1998-2000, up to 20% of the profit could be used for the reserve. 
Since then, the maximum is 25%. As from 2005, a standardised yielded interest is 
assumed which decreases the proportion of postponed tax payments and raises the 
overall tax rate. Only one country had stable effective tax rates: Malta did not change 
the taxation system during the last ten years. Considering the ranking of Malta during 
the years, the overall trend of declining effective tax levels becomes evident. In 1998, 
Malta ranked 16
th; in 2007, Malta ranks 24
th.   23
As can be seen from the preceding outlines, tax reforms in the last decade were 
not only characterised by simple tax rate cuts but also by several approaches yielding at 
financing neutrality or at higher investment incentives. The following outline tries to 
classify the tax reforms and to extract several trends in taxation, going beyond the 
simple discussion of effective tax levels. 
With respect to tax rate cuts, countries differ between those cutting in one big 
step and those cutting in several smaller steps. Over the last ten years, most countries 
decreased the corporate tax rates three or four times. Three countries came up with 
changes in their tax rates every two years or even more often. Poland and Bulgaria 
reduced the rates continuously in five and seven steps, respectively. In Germany, the 
corporate tax rate was modified five times in ten years: a slight decrease of the rate on 
retained earnings in 1999, the introduction of a new corporate income tax system in 
2000 with considerable decrease of the statutory rate applicable now on all profit and a 
one-year increase of the corporate income tax rate in 2003 for the financing of flood 
damages. Three countries did not change their corporate income tax rates at all: France, 
Malta and Sweden. The French corporate tax system, however, is characterised by 
annually modified social surcharges. Large tax rate cuts in one step took place in 
Austria (2005, -9 percentage-points), in Belgium (2003, -6 percentage-points), and in 
Luxembourg (2002, -7 percentage-points).  
Few countries levy substantial non-profit taxes on corporations. There is, 
however, no clear trend of a reduction or extension of this type of tax. The French taxe   24
professionnelle on tangible fixed assets remained more or less stable over time.
17 Italy 
and Hungary levy local taxes based on the value-added of production. The rate is 
constant in Italy, but decreased slightly in Hungary. 
Several countries treat interest income or investment financed with equity 
differently, either by granting allowances for equity financing or by limiting the 
deduction of interest. The intuition behind the former systems is that under general 
taxation investment financed with debt bears a lower tax burden than investment 
financed with equity. Italy applied a dual income tax system. From 1998 to 2001, a 
reduced rate of 19% on the ordinary return applied (except on financial assets), the 
residual income was taxed at the general rate. Austria applied a similar system between 
2001 and 2004 for investments in new assets. Belgium introduced the notional interest 
deduction in 2006 which effectively exempts an ordinary return by allowing the 
deduction of a notional interest and taxes the residual income at the general tax rate. All 
these measures result in a decrease of EATR for investment financed with equity. 
In Germany and Spain, the local taxes do not allow for the full deduction of 
interest, thus EATRs for investment financed with debt bear a higher tax burden. 
Cyprus levies an additional tax on interest income. Moreover, Ireland has a higher 
corporate tax rate on this kind of investment. Both result in higher EATRs for 
investments in financial assets. 
                                                 
17 However, the part of the taxe professionnelle taxing the lump sum, which is not implemented in the 
model, was reduced to zero.   25
With respect to the disposition of earned income, there were two systems at the 
corporate level over time that taxed retained profits differently from distributed profit. 
Until 2000, Germany levied a higher tax on retained earnings than on distributed profits 
on the corporate level. There were several other countries applying a comparable 
system on the shareholder level; however, Germany was the only country applying 
different rates for corporations. Since 2000, Estonia taxes corporations opposite to the 
German system. Profits are not taxed until they are distributed to the shareholder.  
Conclusions 
Corporate investment in the EU Member States is subject to a lower effective tax 
burden than in Japan, Canada and the USA. Within the EU, the difference in tax levels 
between the old EU15 and the new Member States is considerable. Most of the new 
Member States present even lower corporate effective tax levels than the candidate 
countries. Between the 'old' Member States, there is less dispersion in the effective tax 
levels than between the new Member States.  
Countries with a contribution of 10% or more to the EU27 GDP show the highest 
effective tax rates. The lowest effective tax levels on corporate investment can be found 
in Eastern part of Europe and in the Nordic countries.  
Overall, statutory tax rates and effective tax rates are closely correlated in the EU. 
However, some countries have introduced particularities in their tax system which break 
the correlation and drive the EATR either up or down compared to the statutory rates. 
These particularities relate mainly to discriminatory treatment between different types   26
of financing or between different types of assets. In the old Member States, intangibles 
is the most tax-favoured asset, while for the new Member States it is machinery. 
For the period considered, a significant downward trend in the effective corporate tax 
levels can be observed on the EU level. Over the same time period, the differential in 
effective tax levels between the old EU Member States and the new Member States 
almost tripled, due to intensified tax cuts in the new Member States after EU accession. 
Moreover, while the dispersion in effective tax levels in the old EU15 was significantly 
reduced over time, it remained stable for the new member States. While the old EU15 
presents higher consolidation of tax levels, the new Member States experience more 
changes in tax policies over time. 
On average, the effective tax levels in the EU have not come down by the same level as 
the corporate tax rates. The figures, however, suggest that simple corporate tax base 
broadenings by means of less generous capital allowances is not a sufficient explanation 
for this phenomenon. Besides few changes in capital allowances results are driven by 
significant reforms of corporate tax systems and the abolition of incentives in some 
countries.  
The effective tax rates indicators analysed in this paper are forward-looking indicators. 
The approach considers an investment in a specific country by a company in the same 
country. Specific regimes, such as tax facilities for SME investment are beyond the 
scope of the paper. The detailed analysis of cross-border tax treatment of investment is 
not taken into account.    27
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